People v. Camodeca by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





142 PEOPLE 1). CAloIODECA. [52 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6412. In Bank. May 12,1959.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK CAMODECA, 
Appellant. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Attempt to Oommit Orime.-In order to estab-
lish an attempt, it must appear that defendant had a specific 
intent to commit a crime and did a direct. unequivocal act 
toward that end. 
[2] ld.-Attempt to Oommit Orime.-Preparation alone is not 
enough to constitute an attempt to commit a crime; there 
must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, 
and it must be in such progress that it will be conswnmated 
unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of 
the attempter. 
[3] False Pretenses - Attempt - Evidence.-Defendant's admis-
missions to the police that he tried to get $720 from the pur-
chaser of a bar by falsely representing that he could get 
alleged violations against the bar "fixed" and that the money 
was to be for his own use established specific intent to obtain 
money by false pretenses (Pen. Code, § 484) and thus sus-
tained a conviction of attempted grand theft, his conduct in 
seeking to accomplish that objective going well past the stage 
of mere preparation. 
[4] ld.-Attempt-Overt Act.-Defendant's act of meeting the 
purchaser of a bar for the purpose of obtaining money he had 
previously falsely represented was necessary to "fix" alleged 
violations constituted an unequivocal act done toward the 
commission of grand theft and was sufficient to sustain a con-
viction of attempted grand theft. 
[5a, 5b] ld.-Attempt-Deception of Intended Victim.-The fact 
that the purchaser of a bar, who was deceived at the time de-
fendant falsely represented that on payment of a designated 
sum he could get alleged violations "fixed," was no longer 
deceived at the time defendant later met him for the purpose 
of obtaining the money did not prevent conviction of at-
tempted grand theft by false pretenses, since there was not a 
legal but only a factual impossibility of consummating the 
intended offense, i.e., the intended victim was not deceived. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 30, 31; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, § 65 et seq. 
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Theft, § 88; Am.Jur., Falsc Pretenses, § 80. 
McE:. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 9] Criminal Law, § 44; [3-6] 
False Pretenses, § 18; [7] Criminal Law, § 1; [10] Extortion, § 15; 
[11] Criminal Law, § 141. 
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(Overruling rC(Jplc v. Wt'rlll'r, 16 Ca1.2d 216, 225 [105 P.2d 
927], :md People v. Schroeder, 132 CaL\pp.2d 1, 6-8 [281 
P.2d 297], to the cxtt'nt thnt tht'y hold that d;:oct'ption of the 
. intendt'd \'ictim !lnd his rcliancc on the false l'f'p1'C"';f'lItlltinm; 
arc E'sscntial elcmC'nts (If the (lfi't'nse of nttt'mptc<1 ;1';'11<1 thC'ft 
by false prt'tensE's.) 
[6] Id.-Att~mpt-Deception of Intended Victim.-In Il. prosecu-
tion for attempted grand theft by false pretenses it is not 
necessary that defendant's intended victim be deceived by 
the falsity of the representations made to him. 
[7] Criminal Law-Purpose of Law.-One of the purposes of the 
criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to 
injure it. 
[8] Id.-Attempts to Commit Crime.-When it is established that 
defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that ill 
carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused 
harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immat~rial that for 
some collateral reason he could not complete the intended 
crime. 
[9] Id.-Attempts to Commit Crime.-Although the law does not 
impose punishment for guilty intent alone, it does impose 
punishment when guilty intent is coupled with action that 
would result in a crime but for the intervention of some fact 
or circumstance unknown to the defendant. 
[10] Extortion - Attempt - Evidence.-Statements by defend-;;;t 
to the purchaser of a bar thnt "the old man" had paid the 
$720 sought from the purchaser to "fix" alleged violations and 
that there would have to be reimbursement "or else" raised 
the reasonable inference that defendant intended to secure 
money from the purchaser by threatening to procure the 
revocation of his license or otherwise interfere with his busi-
iness by unlawful means, supported an implied finding that 
defendant attempted to place the purchaser in fear of unlawful 
injury to his business or his person if the money was not paid, 
and sustained a conviction of attempted extortion. (Pen. 
Code, §§ 519, 524.) 
[11] Criminal Law - Former Jeopa.rdy - Identity of -Offenses.-
Where defendant first tried to get $720 from the purchaser of 
a bar by falsely representing that certain charges on file 
against his business could be "fi.'{ed" with the Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Board and he met with the purchaser to collect 
the bribe money, such conduct constituted an attempted grand 
theft by false pretenses, and where later, after realizing that 
he was going to encounter difficulty in securing such sum from 
the purchaser, he attenlpted to extort the mOlley from the 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Extortion and Blaekumil, § 21. 
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pw:chaser by veiled threats of injury to his person or business, 
this was a separate and distinct crime, and defendant's con-
viction of both crimes, with concurrent sentences, was proper, 
this not being a ease where but one punishment for one 
criminal act can be inHicted. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. S. Victor Wagler, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for attempts to commit grand theft and extor-
tion. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Robert H. Kroninger for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General, 
Clarence A. Linn, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John S. 
McInerny, Deputy Attorney General, J. F. Coakley, District 
Attorney (Alameda), and C. Zook Sutton, Deputy District 
Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant held a contract of sale and col-
lected the monthly payments on a bar owned and operated by 
William L. Murphy. On June 15, 1957, Murphy discussed 
with defendant the possibility of removing the name of Mur-
phy's "common-law wife" from the contract of sale and from 
the bar's beer and wine license. Defendant stated that this 
could be done but that it would require a "fix." He also told 
Murphy that the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
had certain charges on file against the bar and that those 
charges could be fixed and the license cleared if Murphy would 
give defendant $720 to pass on to certain persons in Sacra-
mento. There were no reported violations in fact, but Murphy 
believed the misrepresentations and attempted to raise the 
money. When he was unable to do so he brought the matter 
to the attention of the district attorney. A meeting between 
Murphy and defendant was arranged for June 18th, when 
defendant was to receive the money. By arrangement with 
Murphy, police officers were hidden near the place of the ! 
second meeting, and the conversation was recorded'. On learn-
ing that Murphy was unable to raise the money, defendant 
stated that the money had already been paid to the officials in 
Sacramento by an unnamed man who would be "unhappy" 
if Murphy did not make prompt reimbursement. Defendant 
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The trial court, sitting without a jury, found defendant 
guilty of two counts, attempt to commit grand theft and at-
tempt to commit extortion. The sentences were to run COil-
-currently. Defendant appeals. 
[1] "In order to establish an attempt, it must appear that 
the defendant had a specific intent to commit a crime and did 
a direct, unequivocal act toward that end .... " (People v. 
Gallardo,41 Ca1.2d 57, 66 [257 P.2d 29].) [2] "Prepara-
tion alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable frag-
ment of the crime committed [and] it must be in such prog-
ress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by 
circumstances independent of the will of the attempter .... " 
(People v. Buffum, 40 Ca1.2d 709, 718 [256 P.2d 317] ; see 
People v. Miller, 2 Cal.2d 527, 530 [42 P.2d 308] ; People v. 
Van B1lskirk, 113 Cal.App.2d 789, 792-793 [249 P.2d 49] ; 
People v. Franquelin, 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783 [241 P.2d 
651] .) 
[3] The evidence in the present ease is sufficient under 
the foregoing rules to sustain the conviction of attempted 
grand theft. Defendant's admissions to the police that he 
attempted to get the $720 from Murphy by falsely representing -
that he could get the violations "fixed" and that the money , 
was to be for his own use, establish a specific intent to obtain 
money by false pretenses. (See Pen. Code, § 484.) His conduct 
in seeking to accomplish that objective went well past the 
stage of "mere preparation." (See People. v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 
2d 709, 718 [256 P.2d 317].) [4] After his meeting with 
Murphy and his threats to secure payment of the bribe money, 
the only further act necessary to consummate the crime of 
grand theft was actual receipt of the money. This conduct was 
unequivocal action done toward the commission of the crime 
(compare People v. Wallace, 78 Ca1.App.2d 726, 742 [178 P.2d 
771] ; People v. Hickman, 31 Cal.App.2d 4, 7-11 f87 P.2d 80] ; 
People v . .Arbernj, 13 Cal.App. 749, 757-758 [114 P. 411]). 
and is clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction of attempted 
grand theft. • 
[6a] Defendant contends, however, that his actions did not 
constitute an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses since 
his victim was not deceived by and did not rely on the mis-
representations. It is urged that although Murphy may have 
been deceived at the June 15th meeting, the direct ineffectual 
act necessary to constitute an attempt did not occur until 
June 18th, when defendant met Murphy to obtain the money. 
It is true that at tIl at time Murphy was no longer deceived and 
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that the element of lack of consent, necessary to the substan-
tive crime of grand theft, was missing. Defendant invokes 
People v. W C1"ncr, 16 Cal.2d 216 [105 P.2d 927], for the propo-
sition that to constitute an attempted grand theft the victim 
Inust be deceived by and must rely on the false representations 
of the defendant. In that case, the defendant and his wife 
represented to a certain McNeil, who was then awaiting trial 
on grand theft charges, that they could have the charges 
against him dismissed for a specified sum. McNeil disbelieved 
their representations and reported the matter to the police, 
who arranged to trap the defendant when the money was paid 
to him. McNeil delivered a package supposedly containing the 
money to the defendant's wife and she and the defendant were 
then arrested. This court reversed a conviction of attempted 
grand theft, stating as an alternative ground of decision: "We 
are satisfied that there cannot be a theft or an att~mpted theft 
of a person's property when voluntarily and without compul-
sion of any sort, and uninfluenced by any false or fraudulent 
representations, he actively hands it over to the alleged thief 
for the purpose of apprehending him as a thief or as an 
attempted thief-however reprehensible the latter's intent may 
be-for under such circumstances the essential element of 
lack of consent is missing." (16 Cal.2d at 225.) Although 
there is other authority in this state to the contrary (People v. 
Wallace, 78 Cal.App.2d 726,740-742 [178 P.2d 771] ; People v. 
Grossman, 28 Cal.App.2d 193, 204 [82 P.2d 76]; see also 
People v. Lavine, 115 Cal.App. 289, 300 [1 P.2d 496]), the 
Werner case supports defendant's position that deception of 
the intended victim and his reliance on the false representa-
tions are essential elements of the offense of attempted grand 
theft by false pretenses. 
We are now convinced, however, that the Werner case is 
unsound in so holding. It failed to recognize the crucial dis-
tinction between the completed crime of false presenses and an 
attempt to commit such a crime. [6] The overwhelming weight 
of authority in this country (e.g., Pcople v. Gm'dner, 144 N.Y. 
119 [38 N.E. 1003] ; State v. Peterson, 109 WaSh. 25 [186 P. 
264,8 A.L.R. 652] ; Williams v. State, 209 Miss. 902 [4880.2<1 
598] ; State Y. Phillips, 36 Mont. 112 [92 P. 299J ; COlllmon-
wealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140 [167 A. :344] ), and in England 
(e.g., Regina v. Light, 11 Crim.App.R. 111; Regina v. Hel1sle1', 
11 Cox.Cr.Cas. 570; Regina v. Roebuck, 7 Cux.()r.Cas. ]26; see 
89 A.L.R. 342) holds that in a prosecution for attempted 
grand theft by false pretenses it is not necessary that the 
) 
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defendant's intended vict.im hI' cicrt'ived by lhr falsit.y of !l\l"' I 
representations made to him (Sl'C also Perkins, Criminal IJaw 
489-494; Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 354-355; 
Williams, Criminal Law 487-490; Miller, Criminal Law 97-
101; Sayre, Cl"imina~ Attempts, 41 Harv.L.&v. 821,850-855; 
Keedy, Cl'imin.a~ Attempts at Common Law, 102 U.Penn.L. 
Re";r. 464, 486-488). 
[7] One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect 
society from those who intend to injure it. [8] When it is 
established that the defendant intended to commit a specific 
crime and that in carrying out this intention he committed an 
act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is im-
material that for some collateral reason he could not complete 
the intended crime. [9] Although the law does not impose 
punishment for guilty intent alone, it does impose punishment 
when guilty intent is coupled with action that would result in a 
crime but for the intervention of some fact or circumstance 
unknown to the defendant. (See People v. Lee KOllg, 95 Cal. 
666,668 [30 P. 800, 29 Am.St.Rep. 165, 17 hR.A. 626] ; Peoplc 
v. Grant, 105 Cal.App.2d 347, 355-357 [233 P.2d 660].) 
[5b] In the present case there was not a legal but only a 
factual impossibility of consummating the intended offense, 
i.e., the intended victim was not deceived. People v. Werncr, 
supra, 16 Cal.2d 216, 225, is overruled and People v. Schroeder, 
132 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-8 [281 P.2d 297], is disapproved to the 
extent that they hold that deception of the intended victim 
and his reliance on the false representations are essential ele-
ments of the offense of attempted grand theft by false pre· 
tenses. 
[10] Defendant's contention that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the conviction of attempted extortion is also 
without merit. Section 524 of the Penal Code provides that 
"every person who attempts, by means of any threat, such 
as is specified in section 519 of this code, to extort money or 
other property from another is punishable .... " Section 519 
provides, in part, that: "Fear, such as will constitute extortion, 
may be induced by a threat ... to do an unlawful injury to 
the person or property of the individual threatened .... " The 
record shows that at the June 18th meeting defendant stated 
to Murphy that "the old man" had already paid the bribe to 
the offiCials in Sacramento on Murphy's behalf and that he 
would have to be reimbursed "or else." He warned: "[T] hat 
is something that you have to come up with. Otherwise you arc 
going to ... up your whole joint. You are going to jeopardize 
) 
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t.hc whole place. You have got to raise the money somewhere, 
Bill, because that is one thing the old man won't stand for .•.. 
When you break your word with him you might as well fold 
that ... joint." The inference is reasonable that defendant 
intended" to secure money from Murphy by threatening to 
procure the revocation of his license or otherwise interfere 
with his business by unlawful means. The evidence supports 
the implied finding that defendant attempted to place Mur-
phy in fear of unlawful injury to his business or his person 
if the money was not paid to him, and thus sustains the 
conviction of attempted extortion. (Compare People v. Hop-
kins,105 Cal.App.2d 708, 709-710 [233 P.2d 948] ; People v. 
Franquelin, 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783-784 [241 P.2d 651]; I 
see 21 Cal.Jur.2d 602,603.) 
[11] Defendant contends that the two cOllvictions cannot 
stand because of the provision of section 654 of the Penal Code 
that C C an act or omission which is made punishable in different 
ways by different provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be pun-
ished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under either bars a prosecution for the same act or 
omission under any other .... " This section has been applied 
to prohibit the double punishment of an accused not only" 
where he has committed but one C C act" in the ordinary sense, 
but also "where a course of conduct violated more than one 
statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible 
transaction which could be punished under. more than one 
statute within the meaning of section 654. Where the question 
is whether a transaction is divisible or indivisible, each case 
must be resolved on its facts. 'f (PeopZe v. Brown, 49 Cal. 
2d 577, 591 [320 P.2d 5].) The record in the present 
case discloses that defendant committed both the crime of 
attempted grand theft and the crime of attempted extortion 
and that his conviction for both crimes, with concurrent sen-
tences, was proper. Defendant first tried to get $720 from 
Murphy by falsely representing to him that certain'charges on ! 
file against his business could be "fixed" with the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Board and he met with Murphy to collect 
the bribe money. This conduct constituted an attempted grand 
theft by false pretenses. Defendant also went further. After 
realizing that he was going to encounter difficulty in securing 
the $720 from Murphy, he attempted to extort the money from 
Murphy by veiled threats of injury to his person or his 
business. Since a "separate and distinct act [has] been 
) 
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established as the basis of each conviction .•. " (People v. 
KROwl", 35 CaUd 175, 187 [217 P.2d 1]), the judgment on 
both counts was proper. (See In. re Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385, 
388-391 [273 P.2d 817]; People v. Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 
561-563 [191 P.2d 1] ; People v. Goodman., 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 
60-62 [323 P.2d 536].) 
The judgment is aftlrmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., I' 
and Peters, J., concurred. . 
